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Abstract
We document the evolution of gender inequality in labor market outcomes — earnings,
labor supply, and wage rates — over the path of economic development, and present evidence
on the potential reasons for this evolution. To this end, we have created a micro database
that compiles 248 surveys from 53 countries between 1967-2014, covering a wide range of per
capita income levels. There is large convergence in the earnings of men and women over the
path of development, driven by female labor force participation and wage rates. We argue
that the single most important factor behind this convergence is demographic transition: the
effects of children on gender gaps (“child penalties”) are large at both low and high levels
of development, but fertility declines drastically over the growth process and thus reduces
the aggregate implications of children. We also document gender convergence in educational
attainment and consider its effects on earnings inequality, arguing that these are significant but
less dramatic than the effects of fertility. Finally, we document striking changes in the values or
norms surrounding the role of women with children, implying that such changes could serve
as a reinforcing mechanism for gender convergence.
⇤Kleven: h.j.kleven@lse.ac.uk; Landais: c.landais@lse.ac.uk. We thank the Editor and two anonymous referees for
comments, and Nicolas Jannin for outstanding research assistance.
1 Introduction
Despite substantial gender convergence over the last century, there is still considerable gender
inequality in labor market outcomes in all developed countries. Evidence from different high-
income countries suggests that most of the remaining gender inequality can be explained by the
unequal impacts of parenthood on men and women (e.g. Waldfogel 1998; Paull 2008; Bertrand
et al. 2010; Goldin 2014; Angelov et al. 2016; Kleven et al. 2016). For example, Kleven et al. (2016)
show that 80% of the remaining earnings inequality between men and women in Denmark results
from “child penalties” faced by mothers, but not fathers. A variety of underlying mechanisms
may be at play — from traditional stories focusing on comparative advantage and the gains from
specialization to more behavioral stories focusing on social norms — but the evidence suggests
that these mechanisms operate primarily through the impacts of children.
The aforementioned studies analyze gender inequality in countries that have already experien-
ced the demographic transition, which reduced the fertility rate per woman from around 5-6 to
around 2. The large child penalties observed in these countries — about 10% of female earnings
per child in Denmark — naturally places the demographic transition at the center stage of the
historical gender convergence in industrialized nations. Indeed, theories of economic growth and
fertility highlight the demographic transition as a key transmission mechanism for gender conver-
gence (e.g. Galor & Weil 1996; Galor 2012). In these theories, technological progress and capital
accumulation complement mentally-intensive tasks more than physically-intensive tasks in pro-
duction, thus favoring the skill in which women have a comparative advantage. This increases
the labor market productivity of women and therefore the opportunity cost of raising children —
the child penalty — inducing women to have fewer children and increase their labor supply and
earnings. An additional mechanism is that technological growh directly increases the returns to
human capital investments, leading parents to substitute from child quantity to child quality and
further spurring the demographic transition and bringing women to the labor market. These the-
ories have two implications: (i) children and education are the key factors in gender convergence,
and (ii) the female penalty per child can be high in advanced countries due to the large investments
in child quality.
In this descriptive paper we bring new evidence to bear on these questions. The contribution of
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our paper lies partly in the data gathering exercise: we have assembled micro datasets containing
information on gender, earnings, labor supply, age, children, education, and gender attitudes for a
large set of countries over time. Our analysis is based on a collection of 248 surveys between 1967-
2014, covering 53 countries across a wide range of income levels. This allows us to document how
gender inequality evolves across levels of economic development and explore potential causes
for this evolution. Our paper complements a voluminous literature on gender gaps in the labor
market, which provides evidence from specific countries or from across high-income countries.
Reviews of this literature have been provided by for example Altonji & Blank (1999), Bertrand
(2011), Blau & Kahn (2016) and Olivetti & Petrongolo (2016).
We begin by documenting the evolution of gender inequality in earnings over the development
path, and then decompose these changes into the three underlying components: labor force par-
ticipation, hours worked, and wage rates. Gender inequality in earnings falls substantially with
development, from a gender gap of around 65% at low income levels to a gender gap of around
35% at high income levels. We show that the convergence of earnings is driven by participation
and wage rates, but not hours. In particular, female labor force participation increases dramati-
cally with development, and as a result the particiption gap falls from 50% to 5-10% as GDP per
capita rises. At the same time, gender differences in hours worked (conditional on working) are
relatively small and very stable, thus contributing very little to changes in earnings inequality.
Turning to the potential causes of these changes, we first focus on the role of children and
the implications of demographic transition. Considering women in childbearing ages (16-40 year
olds), there is a very large difference between those who have children and those who do not. For
women without children, the gender gap in earnings is about 25% and stable across levels of de-
velopment. For women with children, the gender gap is much larger and falls with development,
from about 70% to about 50%. While the difference in levels between these two series is directly
suggestive of the importance of children, the within-series changes are also informative. In parti-
cular, the within-group changes in gender inequality are much smaller than the aggregate change,
which implies that the observed decline in aggregate gender inequality can be explained largely
by a compositional change from those with children to those without children. Indeed, the fraction
of women in childbearing ages who have children falls strongly over the development path, both
because more women do not have any children and because women have children later.1
1While these findings suggest a strong impact of fertility — especially when viewed in tandemwith the recent quasi-
experimental evidence on the impact of children (such as Kleven et al. 2016) — a causal interpretation of fertility is
difficult in this cross-country study due to the fact that fertility is endogenously selected.
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We also consider the role of education. As has been documented elsewhere, there has been
an enormous increase in female education to the point where more women than men take college
degrees in a number of countries (Goldin et al. 2006; Becker et al. 2010). In our sample of 53 coun-
tries, we show that women are now more college educated than men in the vast majority of high-
and middle-income countries. Across levels of development, the gender gap in the fraction with
college degrees falls from +5 percentage points to -8 percentage points and turns negative at a per
capita GDP level of about $25,000. While these education changes can explain some of the decline
in earnings inequality between men and women, they explain much less than children. We argue
there are two reasons for this. The first is that the variation in relative education between men and
women across development levels is small compared to the variation in fertility. The second is that
the impact of education is dampened by children, because even highly educated women face large
child penalties when they become parents (see also Bertrand et al. 2010; Wilde et al. 2010; Kleven
et al. 2016).
Finally, we present evidence on gender attitudes over the path of development, focusing in par-
ticular on the attitudes towards working women with children. As GDP per capita increases, these
attitudes change quite dramatically. For example, there is a strong decline in the fraction of people
who believe that children are negatively affected by having working mothers. Similarly there is a
strong decline in the fraction of people who believe women with young children ought to stay at
home rather than working part-time or full-time, whereas at the same time the views on women
without children or women whose children have left home are relatively stable across levels of
development. Of course, the fact that these norms change with development does not necessarily
mean that they are causally affecting the patterns described above, although a recent and growing
literature suggests that social norms may in fact impact gender differences in labor market out-
comes (see Bertrand 2011 for a review). The most intriguing aspect of our descriptive findings is
perhaps the differential evolution of attitudes towards women with and without children. Con-
sistent with our other findings, this suggests that the evolution of gender inequality should be
analyzed and interpreted to a large degree through the prism of motherhood and fertility.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and empirical approach, section
3 documents some basic facts on gender inequality and development, section 4 explores some
possible causes for the observed patterns, and section 5 concludes.
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2 Data and Methods
2.1 Data
To document the evolution of gender inequality over the path of development, we have assembled
micro datasets with information on gender, earnings, labor supply, age, children, and education
for a large set of countries over time. Our final database combines 248 micro surveys across 53
countries over the period 1967-2014. This is an unbalanced panel as the different country-level
surveys are not available in every year. The countries and years in the data cover a wide range of
development levels, with real GDP per capita between $1,450 and $58,000.2
Table A.I in the appendix lists the primary data sources for each country-year cell in our da-
tabase. A majority of the surveys come from harmonized meta-databases with global or specific
geographic coverage. Our main sources are the Luxembourg Income Studies (LIS), the Socio-
Economic Database for Latin America (SEDLAC), the Inter-university Consortium for Political and
Social Research (ICPSR), the World Bank Living Standards Measurement Study (WB LSMS) and
the Economic Research Forum (ERF) which covers Arab countries, Iran and Turkey. Additional
surveys were collected directly from National Statistics offices.
In order to measure gender inequality in the broadest possible sense and to capture a large set
of margins through which inequality may operate (including labor supply, human capital, occupa-
tional choice, discrimination, etc.), our main focus will be on gender inequality in total earnings.
We define total earnings as the sum of all wages, profits, bonuses, benefits, and in-kind remune-
ration from the exercise of any type of commercial activity for individuals who are employed or
self-employed, permanently or occasionally, during the reference period (usually one year). Our
focus is on gross earnings, i.e. before taxes and transfers.
Our data allows us to observe individual labor supply. We decompose labor supply into labor
force participation and hours worked (when available). An individual is considered to participate
in the labor market if she currently holds a job (or is an entrepreneur), or if she has worked for
income during the reference period (usually one week). For 216 out of the 248 country-year sur-
veys, we also have individual information on the highest education level reached at the time of
the survey. To guarantee consistency across countries and over time, we group educational attai-
nment into three categories: pre-primary or primary education, secondary education, and tertiary
2Throughout the paper, our measure of GDP per capita is PPP-adjusted and expressed in real 2011 dollars. Our me-
asure of GDP per capita comes from the Penn World Tables 9.0 available at http://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/
pwt/.
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education (college or higher).
To investigate the role of children or parenthood, we create a measure for the presence of child-
ren in the household that is consistent across surveys. This measure is a dummy equal to one
whenever the household includes at least one child below the age of 18 who can be identified as a
natural child, an adopted child, or stepchild of the head of household. In the event that the head
of the household has a spouse, the children are assigned to the spouse as well. A limitation of our
data is that in general we cannot identify children living out of their parents’ home. This implies
that, for older men and women, our measure will understate the prevalence of parenthood as the
likelihood that their children have left home is relatively high. To mitigate the issue, the analysis
of the effects of children in section 4 will focus on individuals aged 40 or below.
Because our indicator variable for the presence of children captures only the extensive margin
of fertility, we complement our dataset with information on the intensive margin of fertility using
lifetime fertility rates at the country-year level from the World Bank.3
We finally complement our database with micro data on gender attitudes, with a particular
focus on attitudes towards working women and parenthood/children. Our data comes from three
surveys for which we have consistent information about these attitudes: the European Values
Survey (EVS), the World Values Survey (WVS) and the International Social Survey Programme
(ISSP). Across these surveys, we have 223 country-year cells, covering 82 countries between 1981-
2014 and spanning a GDP per capita range between $700-$72,000. One of our main variables of
interest is an indicator for agreeing with the statement that “a pre-school child suffers if the mother
is working.” One reason for focusing on this question is that it was included using the exact same
wording in the EVS waves 1-4 (1981, 1990, 1999, 2008), the WVS waves 1-6 (covering 1981-2014),
and the ISSP across several waves (1988, 1994, 2002, 2012). We also complement our data with
variables from the 2002 wave of the ISSP that further capture attitudes towards working women
with and without children for a smaller set of countries.
2.2 Methods
We will document the evolution of gender gaps in different outcomes across levels of develop-
ments and over time. From the individual-level data, we compute the gender gap in outcome Y at
the country-year level as DYc,t =
Y¯mc,t Y¯ wc,t
Y¯mc,t
where Y¯ mc,t and Y¯ wc,t denote the average level of the outcome
3The lifetime fertility rate in this data is defined as the (hypothetical) total number of births per women given the
observed age distribution of births. This data has been collected by theWorld Bank from various sources and is available
at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?.
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among men and women, respectively, in country c and year t.
To analyze the evolution of gender gaps across levels of development, we non-parametrically
estimate the relationship between gender gaps and GDP per capita. To reduce the noise introduced
by the differential selection of countries across the distribution of GDP per capita in our data,
and to better capture the within-country effect of moving up the development ladder, we always
report the relationship between gender gaps and GDP per capita after controlling for country fixed
effects. Concretely, we group countries in 20 bins of GDP per capita, where each bin contains an
equal number of country-year observations. We then regress gender gaps DYc,t on a set of dummy
variables for belonging to each of the 20 bins of GDP per capita and on a set of country fixed effects,
i.e.
DYc,t =
20
Â
k=1
 k · I [GDPc,t 2 k] +Â
c
↵c + ⌫c,t. (1)
We will then plot the predicted value of the gender gap in each bin of GDP per capita, having
absorbed the country fixed effects. To be precise, the predicted value of the gender gap in each bin
k is defined as DˆYk =  ˆk + Cˆ, where Cˆ = Âc ↵ˆc/N is the average value of the estimated country
fixed effects across all N countries. In other words, we plot the profile of the gender gap with
respect to GDP per capita for the average country in our sample.
To investigate the evolution of gender gaps over time, we focus on five-year intervals, star-
ting in 1985, and restrict attention to a balanced panel of 11 countries that we observe in each of
these five-year intervals. Due to the balanced panel restriction, the sample for this exercise consists
only of high-income countries: Australia, Denmark, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Net-
herlands, Norway, the UK, and the US. We then follow a similar approach as above by showing
non-parametrically the relationship between gender gaps and time, controlling for country fixed-
effects. That is, we regress gender gaps DYc,t on a set of dummy variables for each five-year interval
and on a set of country fixed-effects, i.e.
DYc,t =
6
Â
j=1
⌘j · I [j = t] +Â
c
↵c + ⌫c,t. (2)
We will plot the predicted value of the gender gap in each time period j, controlling for country
fixed effects, i.e. we plot DˆYj = ⌘ˆj + Cˆ. In other words, we plot the value of the gender gap in each
time period for the average country in our balanced panel of 11 countries.
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3 Gender Inequality Across Levels of Development: Basic Facts
We start by documenting a set of basic facts about the evolution of gender gaps over the course of
development and over time. In Figure 1A, we show the relationship between the gender gap in
total earnings and GDP per capita following the methodology described in section 2.2. The gender
gap is based on all men and women aged 16-64. The graph shows a clear negative relationship
between earnings inequality and GDP per capita. At low levels of development, i.e. in countries
with GDP per capita of around $5,000, the average earnings of women is about 65% below that
of men. At high levels of development, i.e. countries with GDP per capita around $50,000, the
difference in the average earnings of men and women has dropped to roughly 35%. Moreover, the
graph suggests that the relationship between gender inequality and development is non-linear:
gender convergence is much faster in the early stages of development that in the later stages. In
fact, the decline in the gender gap in the $5,000-$25,000 range of GDP per capita is twice as high as
the decline in the $25,000-$45,000 range.
The slowdown of gender convergence at high levels of development is consistent with the
findings of Blau & Kahn (2016) for the US. They show that gender convergence in the earnings
of full-time workers in the US has plateaued over the past 20 years, following a period of strong
convergence around the 1980s. To further explore this issue, Figure 1B considers a balanced panel
of 11 high-income countries and document the evolution of gender gaps in earnings over the past
30 years using the methodology described in section 2.2. The graph shows that across high-income
countries, the decline in earnings inequality between men and women has been limited since the
1980s, decreasing from about 50% to about 40% on average.4 Moreover, most of this convergence
happened in the 1980s, with very little additional convergence since the beginning of the 1990s.
Total earnings are the product of labor supply and wage rates. To investigate the relative im-
portance of the two in explaining the evolution of gender inequality in earnings, we first turn to
the evolution of gender gaps in labor supply. We split labor supply into the extensive margin (la-
bor force participation) and the intensive margin (hours worked conditional on participation). In
Figure 2A, we show the relationship between the gender gap in participation and GDP per capita
for all men and women aged 16-64. The graph shows that development is associated with very
large increases in the labor force participation of women relative to men. As GDP per capita grows
from $5,000 to $50,000, the gender gap in participation falls dramatically from 50% to 5-10%. This
4We note that this decline is consistent with the evidence in Panel A as the average GDP per capita in our balanced
panel is $24,804 in the 1985-1990 interval and $42,621 in the 2010-2015 interval.
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graph also suggests a non-linear effect of development — the decline in the participation gap is
smaller at high levels of per capita GDP — although this phenomenon is not as strong as for ear-
nings. We confirm the slowdown of gender convergence in participation using our balanced panel
of high-income countries in Figure 2B. While there has been clear convergence in participation
over the past 30 years, most of it happened before the mid-1990s. This finding is again consistent
with the findings of Blau & Kahn (2016) for the US.
While labor force participation thus features strong gender convergence over the path of deve-
lopment, Figure 3 shows that there is close to zero convergence in hours worked among those who
are working. As shown in Panel A, the gender gap in hours worked remains constant around 20%
across all levels of GDP per capita. It should be noted, especially considering the large changes
in participation documented above, that the gap in average hours worked include effects from se-
lection into work. In particular, it is natural to expect that the “new” female entrants over the path
of development have lower hours than the “old” entrants, which by itself increases the hours gap.
In other words, the flat profile observed in the figure may reflect the offsetting effects of existing
participants closing the gap and new participants opening it up. It is nevertheless remarkable that
the average hours gap is so stable across the wide range of GDP per capita we consider. Con-
sidering the evolution over time in our balanced panel of high-income countries tells the same
story. As shown in Panel B of Figure 3, there has been no gender convergence in the average hours
worked in the past 30 years. The gender gap remains stubbornly flat at roughly 20%.
Finally, we will decompose the earnings gap across development levels into the contribution
coming from labor supply and the contribution coming from wage rates. To this end, we first note
that the average earnings of gender g can be written as Y¯ g = w¯g · h¯g · P g, where w¯g denotes the
average wage rate per hour worked, h¯g denotes average hours worked conditional on working,
and P g denotes the labor force participation rate. For this expression to hold, w¯g must be an hours-
weighted average wage rate, i.e. w¯g = Âw
g
i ·hgi dgi
Â hgi d
g
i
where dgi is a dummy equal to one if individual i
participates. Hence, changes in the average wage rate w¯g will reflect both changes in individual
wage rates wgi and changes in the distribution of hours on different wage rate types. We come back
to this selection issue below.
We denote the gender gap in total earnings by DY = (Y¯ m   Y¯ w) /Y¯ m, and similarly the gender
gaps in its underlying components by DW = (w¯m   w¯w) /w¯m, DH = (h¯m   h¯w) /h¯m, and DP =
(P¯m   P¯w) /P¯m. With these definitions, we have the following exact decomposition:
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DY = GW +GH +GP , (3)
where
GW ⌘ DW , (4)
GH ⌘ DH ⇥ w¯
w
w¯m
, (5)
GP ⌘ DP ⇥ w¯
wh¯w
w¯mh¯m
. (6)
The first termGW captures the contribution from the gender gap inwage rates, the second termGH
captures the contribution from the gender gap in hours worked, and the third term GP captures
the contribution from the gender gap in participation.
This decomposition is implemented separately in each country-year sample, thus yielding ob-
servations of GW , GH , and GP for each country c and year t in our database. We regress the total
earnings gap DYc,t and each if its components GWc,t, GHc,t, and GPc,t on GDP bin dummies and country
fixed effects. We then calculate the predicted value of each variable in each bin of GDP per ca-
pita, omitting the contribution of the country fixed effect. The resulting decomposition is shown
in Figure 4.
The decomposition shows that the decline of gender inequality in earnings is driven by labor
force participation and wage rates, but not hours. At low levels of development, the participation
gap and the wage rate gap each contribute about 25 percentage points to overall earnings inequa-
lity. At high levels of development, on the other hand, each of them contribute only around 10
percentage points to earnings inequality. At the same time, the contribution of the hours gap is
very stable and therefore does not play a role for the observed gender convergence in earnings.
The combination of the stable hours gap and the narrowing participation and wage rate gaps im-
plies that, at high levels of development, each of the three margins are responsible for about 1/3 of
earnings inequality. This last finding is consistent with the findings for Denmark by Kleven et al.
(2016), who use a quasi-experimental research design to identify the different margins.
Our exact decomposition exercise does not attempt to control for the endogenous relationship
between labor supply and wage rates, in the cross-section or over the path of development. In par-
ticular, the contribution from the gap in average (labor supply weighted) wage rates, DW , depends
on the selection of labor force participants. This may be important here due to the large increase in
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labor force participation over the path of development. If late entrants in the development process
are negatively selected on wage rates, our decomposition exercice would understate convergence
in (unconditional) wage rates across the path of development.
4 Gender Inequality Across Levels of Development: Proximate Causes
4.1 Fertility
A sizeable literature on gender differences in the labor markets of developed countries points to an
important role of children, or parenthood.5 While this literature provides evidence on the impact
of parenthood for a range of North-American and European countries, we broaden the analysis
to include a much larger set of developed and developing countries using our cross-country mi-
cro database. Rather than providing carefully identified estimates of the impact of children on
gender gaps — something which is only possible to do for a subset of developed countries with
sufficiently good data — our objective is to provide descriptive evidence on fertility and gender
inequality across levels of development. The long-run development view naturally makes our evi-
dence suggestive in nature. Still, in combination with the recent quasi-experimental evidence on
the impacts of children from specific developed countries, the evidence presented here arguably
paints a quite persuasive picture of the pivotal role played by demographic transition for gender
convergence.
We entitle this section “proximate causes”, because of course fertility choices are themselves
endogenous over the development path and depend on factors such as technological progress and
capital accumulation (which determines the absolute and relative wage rates of men and women),
the demand for human capital, medical advances and mortality rates, social security, and social
norms. A large literature studies the determinants of fertility (dating back to Becker 1960; Mincer
1963; Becker & Lewis 1973), while the macro growth literature provides models of the joint deter-
mination of fertility and growth (see e.g. Becker & Barro 1988; Barro & Becker 1989; Becker et al.
1990; Galor & Weil 1996; Galor 2012).
To explore the role of fertility for gender inequality over the development path, we will repeat
the type of exercise considered in the previous section, but splitting the sample between those
5See for exampleWaldfogel (1998), Lundberg&Rose (2000), Correll et al. (2007), Sigle-Rushton&Waldfogel (2007a,b),
Paull (2008), Bertrand et al. (2010), Wilde et al. (2010), Fernandez-Kranz et al. (2013), Fitzenberger et al. (2013), Goldin
(2014), Adda et al. (2015), Angelov et al. (2016), and Kleven et al. (2016). These studies provide evidence on the implicati-
ons of parenthood for gender gaps in Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
the UK and the US.
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with children and those without children. For this exercise, a limitation of our database is that the
information about children we observe across all countries and years is the presence of children
below 18 years of age living in the household. We do not observe the presence of children older
than 18 or children who have left home, implying that older workers may be recorded as childless
even though they are in fact parents. For this reason, we will focus on the age range 16-40 in
which this measurement problem is minimal. Focusing on the early part of the life cycle is likely
to understate the importance of children, because we know from the gender literature that child-
driven earnings differences between men and women tend to expand over the middle part of the
life cycle (Bertrand et al. 2010; Goldin 2014; Kleven et al. 2016).
To set the scene, Panel A of Figure 5 shows the demographic transition across levels of develop-
ment using our measure of children. That is, the panel shows the fraction of 16-40 year olds with
children in bins of GDP per capita, controlling for country fixed effects as in the previous graphs.
This fraction drops from about 60% at a GDP per capita of $5,000 to about 35% at a GDP per capita
of $50,000. The drop happens partly because more women do not have any children and partly
because women have children later in the life cycle. Panel B of the figure shows the evolution of
lifetime fertility per woman (using World Bank data) across the same range of GDP per capita. We
see that average fertility falls dramatically from more than 6 to less than 2.
Figure 6 shows gender inequality in earnings among all 16-40 year olds in Panel A, those wit-
hout children in Panel B, and those with children in Panel C. As before, we show gender gaps
across bins of GDP per capita having absorbed country fixed effects. The results for all 16-40 year
olds are qualitatively consistent with the results for 16-64 years olds presented earlier, except that
gender gaps are about 10 percentage points lower in the younger sample. When we split the sam-
ple by children, we see the following. First, the earnings gap among those with children is much
larger than among those without children. In the early phases of development, the gender gap
for parents is about 70%, while the gender gap for non-parents is only about 25%. Second, the
earnings gap for non-parents is completely flat across levels of development, and so this group
does not contribute to the observed aggregate gender convergence in earnings. Third, there is con-
vergence in the earnings gap for parents, from about 70% to about 50% as we move from low to
high levels of development. One possible reason for this is that, conditional on having children,
families have fewer children as income per capita increases.
Both the child and no-child subsamples feature gender gap profiles that are much flatter than
the aggregate profile. This implies that, if the fraction of households with children had stayed con-
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stant over the development path, then the aggregate gender gap might have fallen by much less.
To see the potential role of fertility, Figure 7 illustrates a simple mechanical exercise: It compares
the actual predicted gender gap to a hypothetical predicted gender gap, where the latter assumes
a constant fraction of 16-40 year olds with children at different levels of development. That is, the
hypothetical series is a weighted average of the child and no-child series in Figure 6, using the
average fraction of 16-40 year olds with children across all countries and all years (equal to 44%) as
the weight. This is a mechanical rather than counterfactual construct, because in a worldwhere fer-
tility stayed constant over the development path, the child and no-child series would likely evolve
differently. Nevertheless, it is striking that the decline in the earnings gap in the constant-fertility
scenario of Figure 7 is only about one-quarter of the actual decline over the development path.
Therefore, in a mechanical sense at least, the observed convergence between men and women is
the result of two factors: (i) a reduction in the fraction who has any children, (ii) a reduction in the
gender gap among those who have children, which may itself be driven by changes in the number
of children conditional on having children.
Finally, we turn from earnings gaps to participation gaps in Figure 8, which is constructed in
the same way as Figure 6. The results are broadly consistent with those for earnings: The gap
is much larger for those with children, the gap declines more strongly for parents than for non-
parents (although here there is a decline for both groups), and the gap in both subsamples is flatter
than in the full sample. Hence, again we see that the compositional change from households with
children to households without children is a significant part of the story behind overall gender
convergence.
4.2 Education vs Fertility
We now turn to gender convergence in education and its role for earnings inequality between men
and women. Changes in education affect earnings by changing wage rates and potentially by
changing labor supply as well. Education may also affect fertility, which we have seen is a key
determinant of the gender gap in earnings. Indeed, the classic economic theory of fertility emp-
hasizes substitution between the quantity and quality of children (Becker & Lewis 1973; Becker
1981), so that an increase in the human capital per child (quality) reduces the number of children
(quantity). The reason is that the opportunity cost of children (“the child penalty”) is greater when
their quality is higher. Conversely, changes in fertility may feed back into human capital accumu-
lation and the demand for education. In other words, it is very difficult to empirically separate the
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effects of education/human capital and fertility for the long-run evolution of gender inequality.
While we will present a decomposition analysis that separates the effects of education and fertility
on earnings inequality across levels of development, this analysis is correlational rather than cau-
sal due to the joint determination of education and fertility as well as their interdependence with
other drivers of development.
We start out by describing what happens to gender gaps in education across levels of develop-
ment. Specifically, Figure 9 considers gender gaps in the fraction of men and women with college
degrees, and is constructed in the same was as the previous graphs for earnings and labor supply.
Panel A shows that women’s relative education increases strongly as GDP per capita rises: the
gender gap goes from +5 percentage points to -8 percentage points, implying that at high levels of
development women are ahead of men in terms of college attainment. On average, women over-
take men at an income level of around $25,000.6 Panel B shows the gender gap in college education
over time, focusing on our balanced sample of high-income countries. Here we see that, among
these high-income countries, women closed the college gap around the mid-1990s and have conti-
nued to increase their relative education since then. These descriptive findings are consistent with
those presented by Goldin et al. (2006) for the US and by Becker et al. (2010) for a cross-country
sample.
Having established that both education gaps and fertility decline substantially across develop-
ment levels in our sample, we want to compare the two in terms of their ability to explain the ob-
served gender convergence in earnings. For this purpose, we implement a version of the standard
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973). Specifically, for each country-year
subsample, we estimate separate male and female earnings regressions as follows
Y gi =  
g
0 +  
g
k ·Kgi +  gs · Sgi +  gc ·Cgi + ⌫gi , (7)
where Y gi is the earnings of individual i of gender g, K
g
i is a dummy for the presence of kids, S
g
i
is a dummy for having secondary school as the highest level of education, and Cgi is a dummy for
having college or more as the highest level of education. Denoting the percentage gender gap in
6There is considerable variation across countries, however, and a number of exceptions to the stylized fact that female
education attainment surpasses that ofmen during the growth process (see Figure A.I). For example, in central European
countries (Switzerland, Austria, Germany) women are still substantially less college educated than men. Conversely,
in a number of low- to middle-income countries (such as several Latin American countries) women already have more
college education than men.
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average earnings by DY = (Y¯ m   Y¯ w) /Y¯ m and denoting OLS estimates with a hat, we have
DY = GˆR + GˆK + GˆE , (8)
where
GˆR =
 
 ˆm0    ˆw0
 
/Y¯ m, (9)
GˆK =
 
 ˆmk · K¯m    ˆwk · K¯w
 
/Y¯ m, (10)
GˆE =
 
 ˆms · S¯m +  ˆmc · C¯m    ˆws · S¯w    ˆwc · C¯w
 
/Y¯ m. (11)
Here GˆK is the gender gap due to children, GˆE is the gender gap due to education (both secon-
dary and tertiary), and GˆR is the residual gap. Note that GˆK and GˆE are total effects that include
both the so-called “explained” effect (differences in covariates between men and women) and the
“unexplained” effect (differences in regression coefficients between men and women). In many
decomposition analyses the main goal is to separate the explained and unexplained elements of
gender differences, but our objective is instead to quantify the total contribution of fertility and
education to gender inequality over the development path.7
The preceding analysis is implemented separately in each country-year subsample, thus yiel-
ding observations of GˆR, GˆK , and GˆE for each country and year in our database. As in the appro-
ach used previously, we then regress the total earnings gap DYc,t and its underlying components
GˆRc,t, GˆKc,t, and GˆEc,t on GDP bin dummies and country fixed effects. We then calculate the predicted
value of each variable in each bin GDP per capita, omitting the contribution of the country fixed
effect. The resulting decomposition is shown in Figure 10. It is implemented on the sample of
16-40 year olds due to the problems with observing the children of older households as discussed
above.
The graph shows that both education and fertility have contributed to the decline in earnings
inequality between men and women, but that the effects of fertility are much larger than the effects
of education. The earnings gap coming from fertility falls dramatically from about 35% to about
10% as GDP per capita rises from $5,000 to $50,000. The earnings gap coming from education falls
from about 5% to zero.8 There are two natural reasons for the relatively small effect of education
7For the effect of children GˆK , almost all of the effect is in practice the unexplained effect — the fact that men and
women are affected differently by children  ˆmk 6=  ˆwk — as the fractions of men and women with children are by nature
roughly similar, K¯m ⇡ K¯w .
8To be clear, this education gap includes not only the effect of the gender convergence in college attainment docu-
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in this graph. The first is that the variation in relative education between men and women across
development levels is small compared to the variation in fertility. The second is that the impact of
education is dampened by children, because even highly educated women face large child penal-
ties when they become parents (see also Bertrand et al. 2010; Wilde et al. 2010; Goldin 2014; Kleven
et al. 2016).
While the role of education thus appears modest relative to the role of fertility, it is important
to highlight an important qualification in the interpretation of this finding. As mentioned above,
education may play an indirect role for earnings convergence by being one of the determinants of
fertility choices. As the education levels for adults vary across GDP levels, the desired education
levels for their offspring (which we do not measure directly) also vary, naturally leading to a sub-
stitution from child quantity to child quality. Our decomposition only captures the direct effect of
education.
Two additional empirical limitations are worth highlighting. First, the fact that we consider
16-40 year olds (as the existence of offspring is not well captured for older individuals) may lead
us to underestimate the implications of both education and children. The increase in the relative
education of women is likely to have a growing earnings impact over their career path. Moreover,
the reduction in fertility has impacts that reach beyond the child-rearing ages due to the dynamic
implications of labor market choices made when the children are young. Recent work on the dy-
namic effects of children on gender gaps shows that the effects tend to grow over the middle part
of the life cycle (Bertrand et al. 2010; Goldin 2014; Kleven et al. 2016). Second, in the decomposition
presented here, the effects of children and education are estimated from cross-sectional compari-
sons within each country-year cell, which is not a compelling strategy for identifying true causal
effects. Using a quasi-experimental research design and Danish administrative data, Kleven et al.
(2016) estimates that child-related earnings inequality is considerably higher than what we find
for high levels of GDP per capita in Figure 10. To be clear, the ambition of the exercise presented
here is not to accurately identify the impact of children — this has been done much better for spe-
cific countries with better data — but rather to provide descriptive and suggestive evidence that
changing fertility is pivotal to gender convergence over the development path.
mented in Figure 9, it includes also changes on the primary vs secondary school margin as well as the unexplained
effects (different returns to education) of both college and secondary school.
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4.3 Gender Norms
So far we have focused on traditional explanations for the increase in gender equality over the
process of economic growth — changes in fertility and education. A potentially reinforcing me-
chanism is that social norms regarding gender roles may change as economies develop. A recent
literature on gender argues that factors like norms, culture and gender identity may play a signi-
ficant role (see Bertrand 2011 for a review). For example, Fernandez et al. (2004) show that men
brought up in families with working mothers are more likely to have working wives. They argue
this is because these men have developed less traditional gender role attitudes during their child-
hood, and that the growing number of such “modern men” is a significant factor in the steady rise
in female labor force participation. Related, Farre & Vella (2013) show that men whose mothers
had more modern gender role attitudes are themselves more more likely to have modern attitudes
and have wives with modern attitudes. While these studies focus on correlations between mothers
and daughters-in-law, Kleven et al. (2016) find evidence of intergenerational transmission directly
between mothers and daughters. Specifically they show that a woman’s child penalty in earnings
or labor supply is strongly related to the child penalty incurred by her own mother, even after
controlling for a rich set of covariates.
In all of these stories, an initial increase in the labor participation of women — perhaps trigge-
red by traditional factors such as an increase in women’s relative wages and a reduction in fertility
— will change the attitudes or preferences or their sons and daughters in a way that reinforces the
rise of female participation in the next generation. Hence this evidence suggests that gender norms
can be an important propagation mechanism for the development patterns we have documented
above.
A necessary condition for these stories to have any traction is that gender role attitudes —
and especially attitudes towards women with children — do in fact change substantially with
development. Herewe present evidence that this is indeed the case. In Figure 11we consider views
on whether children are negatively impacted by having working mothers, specifically whether or
not people believe that “a pre-school child suffers if the mother is working.” The graph plots the
fraction of people who believes that children suffer from having working mothers in bins of per
capita GDP, having absorbed country fixed effects as in the previous analysis. The graph shows a
striking, monotonic decline in the fraction of people who hold this view, from 80% to 20% as per
capita GDP rises from $5,000 to $50,000.
Figure 12 considers views on whether women should work outside the home (full-time or part-
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time) or stay at home, depending on whether or not they have children. Specifically the question
distinguishes between four situations: women without children (Panel A), women with children
under school age (Panel B), women with children in school (Panel C), and women with children
who have left home (Panel D). For each of these scenarios, we plot the fraction who think women
should stay at home in bins of per capita GDP, taking out country fixed effects. The graph shows
striking differences between the views on women with young children (under school age and
to a lesser degree school age) and the views on women without children or older children. The
difference lies in both the levels and the development profile. The fraction who believe women
without children or older children should stay at home is very low and relatively flat across levels of
development. By contrast, the fraction who believe women with children under school age should
stay at home is very high at low levels of development (close to 70%), but declines substantially
with development (to about 20%). The sharp difference between the attitudes on women with
(young) children and all other women again highlights that children and motherhood are key to
understanding gender convergence.
These findings show that the necessary condition for norms and culture to matter for gender
equalization, namely that they change over the course of development, is satisfied. Two caveats
on interpretation are worth flagging. First and obviously, the descriptive findings presented here
do not by themselves tell us if norms and culture have causal impacts on gender convergence, if
they are simply by-products of such convergence, or if both culture and convergence are driven
by other common causes. Second, while the survey questions are meant to elicit values or norms,
they may also pick up perceptions about public policies, institutions, or other aspects of society.
For example, one is more likely to think a mother should stay at home with her young children in
a country without any publicly provided child care, independently of any moral attitudes about
the issue.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have documented the evolution of gender inequality in labor market outcomes
over the long run of development, and we have discussed some of the factors — primarily fertility,
education, and norms — that may be driving the observed patterns. Our paper complements
the many excellent overviews written on gender gaps in the labor market as well as on economic
growth and fertility.
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A key contribution of our paper lies in the data gathering effort that underlies the analysis:
we have created a micro database covering 53 countries over the period 1967-2014 by assembling
248 different surveys from a variety of sources. The dataset covers a wide range of development
levels, and the fact that we observe countries more than once allows us to absorb country fixed
effects when studying gender convergence over the development path. This reduces the noise
introduced by the differential selection of countries across GDP per capita levels, and allows us to
better capture the within-country effect of moving up the development ladder.
We have shown that there is large gender convergence in total earnings across levels of deve-
lopment. This is driven by female labor force participation and wage rates, but not hours worked
conditional on working. We have argued that the most important factor behind this convergence
is the demographic transition that takes place across development levels. Lifetime fertility rates
decline from more than 6 children per woman to less than 2 children per woman across the range
of GDP per capita we consider. Given the large effects of children on gender gaps at both low
and high levels of development, such large fertility declines have drastic implications for gender
inequality. We also argue that education convergence plays a significant role for earnings conver-
gence — though not as large as fertility — and highlight that it is empirically difficult to separate
the implications of fertility and education (in a true causal sense) as they feed into each other over
the development path, as implied by growth models with endogenous fertility. Finally, we have
documented a set of striking changes in the views on gender roles, and especially those related to
working womenwith children, that take place over the development path. We discussed these pat-
terns in the light of recent work suggesting that norms and culture could be important propagation
mechanism for gender convergence.
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Figure 1: Gender Inequality in Earnings
A: Gender Inequality Across Development
Unbalanced Panel of All Countries
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Notes: Panel A displays the relationship between gender gaps in total earnings among the 16-64 year olds and PPP-
adjusted real GDP per capita for our 248 country-years. Observations are divided in 20 bins of GDP per capita, with
similar number of observations per bin. We report the average gender gap in each bin controlling for country fixed
effects, along with the robust 95% confidence interval, following the methodology described in section 2.2. Panel B
displays the evolution over time of gender gaps in total earnings among the 16-64 year olds in our balanced panel of 11
high income countries. See text for details.
22
Figure 2: Gender Inequality in Labor Force Participation
A: Gender Inequality Across Development
Unbalanced Panel of All Countries
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Notes: Panel A displays the relationship between gender gaps in labor force participation among the 16-64 year olds
and PPP-adjusted real GDP per capita for our 248 country-years. Observations are divided in 20 bins of GDP per capita,
with similar number of observations per bin. We report the average gender gap in each bin controlling for country
fixed effects, along with the robust 95% confidence interval, following the methodology described in section 2.2. Panel
B displays the evolution over time of gender gaps in labor force participation among the 16-64 year olds in our balanced
panel of 11 high income countries. See text for details.
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Figure 3: Gender Inequality in Hours Worked
A: Gender Inequality Across Development
Unbalanced Panel of All Countries
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Notes: Panel A displays the relationship between gender gaps in hours worked conditional on participation (intensive
margin) among the 16-64 year olds and PPP-adjusted real GDP per capita for our 248 country-years. Observations are
divided in 20 bins of GDP per capita, with similar number of observations per bin. We report the average gender gap in
each bin controlling for country fixed effects, along with the robust 95% confidence interval, following the methodology
described in section 2.2. Panel B displays the evolution over time of gender gaps in hours worked conditional on
participation among the 16-64 year olds in our balanced panel of 11 high income countries. See text for details.
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Figure 4: Decomposing Earnings Inequality Across Levels of Development
Participation, Hours, and Wage Rates
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Notes: The figure decomposes the gender gap in total earnings shown in Figure 1 panel A into the respective contribu-
tions of gender gaps in participation, conditional hours, and wage rates, following the exact decomposition of equation
3. The decomposition is performed on each country-year subsample. Each component of the decomposition is then
regressed on GDP bin dummies and country fixed effects, and we report the coefficients for each GDP bin dummy,
following the methodology described in section 2.2. See text for details.
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Figure 5: Demographic Transition
A: Fraction With Children
16-40 Year Olds
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Notes: Panel A displays the relationship between the probability to have at least one child among the 16-40 year olds
and PPP-adjusted real GDP per capita for our 248 country-years. Observations are divided in 20 bins of GDP per capita,
with similar number of observations per bin. We report the average probability in each bin controlling for country fixed
effects, along with the robust 95% confidence interval, following the methodology described in section 2.2. To capture
fertility along the intensive margin, Panel B displays the relationship between PPP-adjusted real GDP per capita and
lifetime fertility rates available from the World Bank, following a similar method. See text for details.
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Figure 6: Gender Inequality in Earnings: The Role of Children
A: All 16-40 Year Olds
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Notes: The figure decomposes the overall gender gap in earnings for individuals with and without children. Note that
we do not observe the presence of children older than 18 or children who have left home, implying that older workers
may be recorded as childless even though they are in fact parents. For this reason, we focus on the age range 16-40 in
which this measurement problem is minimal. Panel A reproduces Figure 1 panel A for the sample of 16-40 year olds.
Panel B (resp. panel C) follows the same methodology, restricting the sample to the16-40 year olds without children
(resp. with children).
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Figure 7: Demographic Transition and Gender Inequality in Earnings
Actual Gender Gap vs Hypothetical Gender Gap Under Constant Fraction With Children
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Notes: The figure compares the actual gender gap in earnings to the predicted gender gap assuming the fraction of
individuals with children had remained constant throughout the development path. The black curve reproduces the
actual gender gap in earnings for the 16-40 year olds from panl A of Figure 6. The red curve is the hypothetical gender
gap assuming that the fraction ! of 16-40 year olds with children across all GDP per capita levels had remained constant
at its average level in our 248 country-years. The red curve is therefore a weighted average of the two curves in panel B
and C of Figure 6, with weights equal 1  ! and ! respectively.
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Figure 8: Gender Inequality in Labor Force Participation: The Role of Children
A: All 16-40 Year Olds
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Notes: This figure decomposes the overall gender gap in labor force participation for individuals with and without
children. Note that we do not observe the presence of children older than 18 or children who have left home, implying
that older workers may be recorded as childless even though they are in fact parents. For this reason, we will focus on
the age range 16-40 in which this measurement problem is minimal. Panel A reproduces Figure 2 panel A for the sample
of individuals between 16-40 years old. Panel B (resp. panel C) follows the same methodology, restricting the sample to
individuals between 16-40 years old without children (resp. with children).
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Figure 9: Gender Inequality in College Degrees
A: Gender Inequality Across Development
Unbalanced Panel of All Countries
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Notes: Panel A displays the relationship between gender gaps in the probability to hold a college degree among the
16-64 year olds and PPP-adjusted real GDP per capita for our 248 country-years. Observations are divided in 20 bins of
GDP per capita, with similar number of observations per bin. We report the average gender gap in each bin controlling
for country fixed effects, along with the robust 95% confidence interval, following the methodology described in section
2.2. Panel B displays the evolution over time of gender gaps in the probability to hold a college degree among the 16-64
years olds in our balanced panel of 11 high income countries. See text for details.
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Figure 10: Decomposing Earnings Inequality Across Levels of Development
Fertility vs Education
Residual
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Notes: The figure performs a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the gender gaps in total earnings among the 16-40 year
olds displayed in Figure 6 panel A. The O-B decomposition isolates the respective contributions of fertility, education,
and a residual, following the specification of equation 8. The decomposition is performed on each country-year subs-
ample. Each component of the country-year decompositions is then regressed on GDP bin dummies and country fixed
effects, and we report the coefficients for each GDP bin dummy. See section 4.2 for details.
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Figure 11: Changing Views on the Children of Working Women
Do you agree with the statement “a pre-school child suffers if the mother is working”?
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Notes: The figure reports the relationship between PPP-adjusted real GDP per capita and the average probability to
agree with the statement “a pre-school child suffers if the mother is working”, across our 223 country-year cells, when
pooling together the EVS waves 1-4 (1981, 1990, 1999, 2008), the WVS waves 1-6 (covering 1981-2014), and the ISSP
across several waves (1988, 1994, 2002, 2012). Observations are divided in 10 bins of GDP per capita, with similar
number of observations per bin. We report the average probability in each bin controlling for country fixed effects,
along with the robust 95% confidence interval. See text for details.
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Figure 12: Changing Views on Working Women
A: Women Without Children B: Women With Children Under School Age
Do you think that women should work outside the home full-time Do you think that women should work outside the home full-time
or part-time when they are married but with no children? or part-time when there is a child under school age?
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C: Women With Children In School D: Women With Children Who Have Left Home
Do you think that women should work outside the home full-time Do you think that women should work outside the home full-time
or part-time when the youngest child is still in school? or part-time when the child has left the home?
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Notes: The figure is based on data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) in 2002 and reports attitudes to-
wards working women, captured in four different statements. Each panel shows the relationship between PPP-adjusted
real GDP per capita and the average probability to agree with a particular statement in each country. Observations are
divided in 10 bins of GDP per capita, with similar number of observations per bin. We report the average probability in
each bin controlling for country fixed effects, along with the robust 95% confidence interval. See text for details.
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Figure A.I: Gender Inequality in College Across Countries Today (2010-2015)
-20 -10 0 10 20
Gender Gap (pp)
Switzerland
South Korea
Japan
Austria
Germany
India
Taiwan
China
Netherlands
Egypt
Guatemala
Romania
Mexico
Peru
Ireland
South Africa
Czech Republic
Greece
Belgium
Serbia
Georgia
France
Italy
Slovakia
Canada
Dominican Republic
Colombia
Uruguay
United Kingdom
Brazil
Panama
Israel
Spain
United States
Australia
Denmark
Sweden
Norway
Poland
Iceland
Slovenia
Finland
Estonia
Russia
Notes: The figure reports the latest gender gap in the probability to hold a college degree among the 16-64 year olds for
all countries for which we have a survey in the period 2010-2015.
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Table A.1 - List of Data Sources for Each Country
and Year
Table A.1: Panel A- Countries A-C
Country Year Meta-base Primary Survey
Australia
1981 LIS Survey of Income and Housing Costs
1985 LIS Survey of Income and Housing Costs
1989 LIS Survey of Income and Housing Costs
1995 LIS Survey of Income and Housing Costs
2001 LIS Survey of Income and Housing Costs
2003 LIS Survey of Income and Housing Costs
2008 LIS Survey of Income and Housing Costs
2010 LIS Household Expenditure Survey
Austria
1994 LIS European Household Panel / AT ECHP
1997 LIS European Household Panel / AT ECHP
2000 LIS European Household Panel / AT ECHP
2004 LIS Survey on Income and Living Conditions
Belgium
1985 LIS Socio-Economic Panel
1988 LIS Socio-Economic Panel
1992 LIS Socio-Economic Panel
1995 LIS Panel Study of Belgian Households
1997 LIS Socio-Economic Panel
2000 LIS Panel Study of Belgian Households
Belize 1999 SEDLAC Labour Force Survey
Bulgaria
2001 WB LSMS Integrated Household Survey
2003 WB LSMS Integrated Household Survey
2007 WB LSMS Integrated Household Survey
Burkina Faso 2013 WB LSMS Enquête Multisectorielle Continue
Brazil 2006 LIS Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios
Canada
2009 LIS Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios
2009 SEDLAC Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios
2011 LIS Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios
2013 LIS Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios
1981 LIS Survey of Consumer Finances
1987 LIS Survey of Consumer Finances
1991 LIS Survey of Consumer Finances
1994 LIS Survey of Consumer Finances
1997 LIS Survey of Consumer Finances
1998 LIS Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics
2000 LIS Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics
2004 LIS Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics
2007 LIS Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics
2010 LIS Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics
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Table A.1: Panel B - Countries C-F
Country Year Meta-base Primary Survey
Chile 2009 SEDLAC Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional
China 2002 LIS Chinese Household Income Survey Project
Colombia
2004 LIS Encuesta Continua de Hogares
2007 LIS Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares
2009 SEDLAC Encuesta Nacional de Hogares
2010 LIS Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares
2013 LIS Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares
Costa Rica 2009 SEDLAC Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples
Czech Rep.
1992 LIS Czech Microcensus
1996 LIS Czech Microcensus
2002 LIS Czech Microcensus
2004 LIS Survey on income and living Conditions
2007 LIS Survey on income and living Conditions
2010 LIS Survey on income and living Conditions
Denmark
1987 LIS Law Model
1992 LIS Law Model
1995 LIS Law Model
2000 LIS Law Model
2004 LIS Law Model
2007 LIS Law Model
2010 LIS Law Model
Dominican Rep. 2007 LIS Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos
Ecuador 2009 SEDLAC Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida
Egypt 2012 LIS/ERF Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey
Estonia 2004 LIS Estonian Social Survey
Finland
2007 LIS Estonian Social Survey
2010 LIS Estonian Social Survey
1987 LIS Income Distribution Survey
1991 LIS Income Distribution Survey
1995 LIS Income Distribution Survey
2000 LIS Income Distribution Survey
2004 LIS Income Distribution Survey
2007 LIS Survey on Income and Living Conditions
2010 LIS Survey on Income and Living Conditions
France
1978 LIS Enquête Budget des Familles
1984 LIS Enquête Budget des Familles
1989 LIS Enquête Budget des Familles
2000 LIS Enquête Budget des Familles
2005 LIS Enquête Budget des Familles
2010 LIS Enquête Budget des Familles
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Table A.1: Panel C - Countries G-I
Country Year Meta-base Primary Survey
Georgia
2010 LIS Integrated Household Survey
2013 LIS Integrated Household Survey
Germany
1973 LIS Income and Consumer Survey
1978 LIS Income and Consumer Survey
1983 LIS Income and Consumer Survey
1984 LIS German Social Economic Panel Study
1989 LIS German Social Economic Panel Study
1994 LIS German Social Economic Panel Study
2000 LIS German Social Economic Panel Study
2004 LIS German Social Economic Panel Study
2007 LIS German Social Economic Panel Study
2010 LIS German Social Economic Panel Study
Greece
1995 LIS Household Income and Living Conditions Survey
2000 LIS Household Income and Living Conditions Survey
2004 LIS Survey on Income and Living Conditions
2007 LIS Survey on Income and Living Conditions
2010 LIS Survey on Income and Living Conditions
Guatemala 2006 LIS Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida
Honduras 2009 SEDLAC Encuesta Permanente de Hogares
Hungary
1991 LIS Household Monitor Survey
1994 LIS Household Monitor Survey
1999 LIS Household Monitor Survey
2005 LIS Household Monitor Survey
Iceland
2004 LIS Survey of Income and Living Conditions
2007 LIS Survey of Income and Living Conditions
2010 LIS Survey of Income and Living Conditions
India
2004 LIS India Human Development Survey
2011 LIS India Human Development Survey
Ireland
1994 LIS Living in Ireland Survey
1995 LIS Living in Ireland Survey
1996 LIS Living in Ireland Survey
2004 LIS Survey on Income and Living Conditions
2007 LIS Survey on Income and Living Conditions
2010 LIS Survey on Income and Living Conditions
Israel
2001 LIS Household Expenditure Survey
2005 LIS Household Expenditure Survey
2007 LIS Household Expenditure Survey
2010 LIS Household Expenditure Survey
2012 LIS Household Expenditure Survey
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Table A.1: Panel D - Countries I-N
Country Year Meta-base Primary Survey
Italy
1986 LIS Survey on Household Income and Wealth
1987 LIS Survey on Household Income and Wealth
1989 LIS Survey on Household Income and Wealth
1991 LIS Survey on Household Income and Wealth
1993 LIS Survey on Household Income and Wealth
1995 LIS Survey on Household Income and Wealth
1998 LIS Survey on Household Income and Wealth
2000 LIS Survey on Household Income and Wealth
2004 LIS Survey on Household Income and Wealth
2008 LIS Survey on Household Income and Wealth
2010 LIS Survey on Household Income and Wealth
Japan
2001 ICPSR Japanese General Social Survey
2002 ICPSR Japanese General Social Survey
2006 ICPSR Japanese General Social Survey
2008 LIS Japan Household Panel Survey Data
Jordan
2008 ERF Labour Force Survey
2009 ERF Labour Force Survey
2010 ERF Labour Force Survey
2011 ERF Labour Force Survey
2013 ERF Labour Force Survey
2014 ERF Labour Force Survey
Mexico
1984 LIS Household Income and Expenditure Survey
1989 LIS Household Income and Expenditure Survey
1992 LIS Household Income and Expenditure Survey
1994 LIS Household Income and Expenditure Survey
1996 LIS Household Income and Expenditure Survey
2002 LIS Household Income and Expenditure Survey
Netherlands
2004 LIS Household Income and Expenditure Survey
2008 LIS Household Income and Expenditure Survey
2010 LIS Household Income and Expenditure Survey
2012 LIS Household Income and Expenditure Survey
1983 LIS Additional Enquiry on the Use of (Public) Services
1987 LIS Additional Enquiry on the Use of (Public) Services
1990 LIS Additional Enquiry on the Use of (Public) Services
1993 LIS Socio-Economic Panel Survey
1999 LIS Socio-Economic Panel Survey
2004 LIS Survey on Income and Living Conditions
2007 LIS Survey on Income and Living Conditions
2010 LIS Survey on Income and Living Conditions
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Table A.1: Panel E - Countries N-S
Country Year Meta-base Primary Survey
Norway
1979 LIS Income Distribution Survey
1986 LIS Income Distribution Survey
1991 LIS Income Distribution Survey
1995 LIS Income Distribution Survey
2000 LIS Income Distribution Survey
2004 LIS Income Distribution Survey
2007 LIS Household Income Statistics
2010 LIS Household Income Statistics
Panama
2007 LIS Encuesta Contínua de Hogares
2010 LIS Encuesta Contínua de Hogares
2013 LIS Encuesta Contínua de Hogares
Peru
2004 LIS Encuesta Nacional de Hogares
2007 LIS Encuesta Nacional de Hogares
2010 LIS Encuesta Nacional de Hogares
2013 LIS Encuesta Nacional de Hogares
Poland
1986 LIS Household Budget Survey
1992 LIS Household Budget Survey
1995 LIS Household Budget Survey
2007 LIS Household Budget Survey
2010 LIS Household Budget Survey
2013 LIS Household Budget Survey
Russia
2000 LIS Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey
2004 LIS Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey
2007 LIS Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey
2010 LIS Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey
2013 LIS Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey
Serbia
2006 LIS Household Budget Survey
2010 LIS Household Budget Survey
2013 LIS Household Budget Survey
Slovakia
1992 LIS Slovak Microcensus
2004 LIS Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
2007 LIS Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
2010 LIS Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
Slovenia
1997 LIS Household Budget Survey
1999 LIS Household Budget Survey
2004 LIS Household Budget Survey
2007 LIS Household Budget Survey
2010 LIS Household Budget Survey
South Africa
2008 LIS National Income Dynamics Study
2010 LIS National Income Dynamics Study
2012 LIS National Income Dynamics Study
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Table A.1: Panel F - Countries S-U
Country Year Meta-base Primary Survey
South Korea 2006 LIS Household Income and Expenditure Survey
Spain
1990 LIS Family Expenditure Survey
1995 LIS Spanish European Community Household Panel
2000 LIS Spanish European Community Household Panel
2004 LIS Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida
2007 LIS Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida
2010 LIS Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida
2013 LIS Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida
Sweden
1975 LIS Income Distribution Survey
1981 LIS Income Distribution Survey
1987 LIS Income Distribution Survey
1992 LIS Income Distribution Survey
1995 LIS Income Distribution Survey
2000 LIS Income Distribution Survey
2005 LIS Income Distribution Survey
Switzerland
1982 LIS Swiss Income and Wealth Survey
1992 LIS Swiss Poverty Survey
Taiwan
1981 LIS Survey of Family Income and Expenditure
1986 LIS Survey of Family Income and Expenditure
1991 LIS Survey of Family Income and Expenditure
1997 LIS Survey of Family Income and Expenditure
2000 LIS Survey of Family Income and Expenditure
2005 LIS Survey of Family Income and Expenditure
2007 LIS Survey of Family Income and Expenditure
2010 LIS Survey of Family Income and Expenditure
2013 LIS Survey of Family Income and Expenditure
United-Kingdom
1974 LIS Family Expenditure Survey
1979 LIS Family Expenditure Survey
1986 LIS Family Expenditure Survey
1991 LIS Family Expenditure Survey
1994 LIS Family Expenditure Survey
1995 LIS Family Expenditure Survey
1999 LIS Family Expenditure Survey
2004 LIS Family Expenditure Survey
2007 LIS Family Expenditure Survey
2010 LIS Family Expenditure Survey
2013 LIS Family Expenditure Survey
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Table A.1: Panel G - Countries U-V
Country Year Meta-base Primary Survey
United-States
1974 LIS Current Population Survey
1979 LIS Current Population Survey
1986 LIS Current Population Survey
1991 LIS Current Population Survey
1994 LIS Current Population Survey
1997 LIS Current Population Survey
2000 LIS Current Population Survey
2004 LIS Current Population Survey
2007 LIS Current Population Survey
2010 LIS Current Population Survey
2013 LIS Current Population Survey
Uruguay
2004 LIS Encuesta Continua de Hogares
2007 LIS Encuesta Continua de Hogares
2010 LIS Encuesta Continua de Hogares
2013 LIS Encuesta Continua de Hogares
Venezuela 2006 SEDLAC Encuesta de Hogares Por Muestreo
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